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Review
BLUDGEON DIPLOMACY
The 'Godfather of Secession' defends himself and his cause
Rable, George C.
Summer 2000
Davis, William C. and Rhett, Robert Barnwell. A Fire-Eater Remembers: The
Confederate Memoir of Robert Barnwell Rhett. University of South Carolina
Press, 2000-04-01. ISBN 157003348X
Even the title of Robert Barnwell Rhett's incomplete memoir breathes a kind
of ideological fanaticism: "The Last Decade, seen in the extinction of Free
Government in the United States, and the Downfall of the Southern
Confederacy, in connexion with political Life and Services of the Honorable
Robert Barnwell Rhett." Rigid, contentious, and breathtakingly egotistical, Rhett
made other southern fire-eaters seem almost calm and restrained by comparison.
Born into an eminent family - whose name was changed from Smith to
Rhett in 1837 - he became a prosperous planter whose real passion was politics,
or more precisely political argument. While still in his twenties, Rhett became a
fervent nullifier committed to an austere 18th-century republicanism that would
shape his entire career.
A restless disciple of John C. Calhoun, he flirted with disunion almost from
the beginning of his political life and certainly earned the sobriquet, "Father of
Secession." Service in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate
failed to temper his fanatical devotion to South Carolina as the epitome of free
government rightly understood. His vision was at once narrow and intense, his
polemics both sharply honed and wildly off base.
This unfinished apologia bristles with a maddening mix of unfounded
assertions, misleading information, endless paragraphs, and self-pitying cant.
The most unattractive features of Rhett's mind and personality crop up on nearly
every page. Although Rhett began working on the manuscript shortly after the
Civil War, it remained in an incomplete and fragmentary state at the time of his
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death - a rambling and bitter epitaph that served neither its author nor his cause
particularly well.
William C. Davis has meticulously gone through the various versions of
Rhett's memoir, carefully noted textual alterations, and has attempted to fashion
it into a coherent book. Davis terms the work "arrogant," an apt-enough
description that some readers may consider too mild. Although Rhett often wrote
about himself in the third person, this futile effort at literary detachment was an
affectation and sham because, in his own mind, he could always boil down any
knotty problems into a series of clear principles. The only catch was that his
beloved Southland failed to recognize and take advantage of his profound
wisdom. At the outset of his memoir, Rhett informed readers that he would tell
the unvarnished truth about how the Confederacy was created and who caused its
downfall.
No use for party politicians
Like other South Carolina radicals, Rhett had no use for party politicians
and harshly criticized northern Democrats for embracing what he saw as a
"consolidationist" view of government. That such a description has little basis in
reality seemed of trivial consequence. Always sensitive to the smallest
encroachments of power on liberty, Rhett made other southern constitutional
hairsplitters appear lax and pliable. In print as in life, he shunned diplomatic
niceties and preferred to assail his enemies with the bludgeon rather than the
stiletto. Like all too many Confederate memoirs, notably those of Jefferson
Davis and Alexander Stephens, this book often makes for dry reading, especially
when the author harps on some constitutional fine point.
According to Rhett, secessionists were only resisting the unconstitutional
encroachment of a tyrannical majority, though he did concede that Southerners
were also responding to attacks on slavery. Yet in attempting to portray himself
as the most important of the Confederate founding fathers - and indeed the
champion of free trade and various other reforms in the Confederate constitution
- he failed to acknowledge his own disappointment with the document. He never
mentioned how he had pushed for reopening the African slave trade, for
repealing the Federal Constitution's three-fifths clause so as to increase
representation of areas with large numbers of slaves, and for barring the
admission of free states to the new southern nation. Nor did he discuss how his
fellow delegates to the Montgomery convention rejected these extreme proposals
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and repudiated Rhett's efforts to assume leadership of the fledgling nation. At
one point he concedes that "slavery was the issue" that drove the two sections
apart but then quickly adds, echoing both Alexis de Tocqueville and Calhoun,
that the North was attempting to destroy the basis of free government by
establishing a tyranny of the majority.
Thoroughly unreliable history
As a piece of history, Rhett's work is thoroughly unreliable. Davis's notes,
amplifying and more often correcting false and misleading statements, take up
nearly half as much space as the memoir itself. In addition, Rhett's animus
against Jefferson Davis colors nearly the entire work. To Rhett, Davis had
always seemed too moderate, a man whose heart was never in the cause of
southern independence. Rhett, however, never acknowledges his own thwarted
ambition, a firm belief that he deserved to be the first president of the
Confederate States of America. Because of bitter disappointment and sheer
pique, Rhett began a relentless campaign to undermine the new administration,
even raising objections to buying furniture for the executive mansion in
Richmond.
Besides castigating Davis for relying too much on the power of "King
Cotton" to force the European powers into granting diplomatic recognition to the
Confederacy, Rhett engaged in persistent second-guessing on military affairs.
Davis stands accused of neglecting vigorous preparation to obtain arms and
ammunition in the War's early months. Like many an armchair strategist, Rhett
claimed that the Confederates could have easily advanced on Washington after
the victory at First Manassas. But such opportunities were often squandered by a
pigheaded commander in chief determined to ride roughshod over Congress
through the use of executive patronage, secret sessions, and his veto pen. Even
on naval affairs, Rhett considered himself a fount of wisdom.
In order to make his case against Davis, Rhett frequently distorts, omits, and
exaggerates, but then accuses the president of propounding various falsehoods.
At one point, editor Davis puckishly remarks, "Suffice it to say that if [Jefferson]
Davis had somehow enabled his armies to walk on water, Rhett would only have
attacked him for getting the soldiers' stockings wet."
During the War and often in the editorial columns of the Charleston 
Mercury, Rhett called for vigorous war policies, but even when he
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acknowledged the necessity of conscription, he still offered constitutional
quibbles and blamed Davis for making such a draconian measure necessary.
From the first, Rhett had opposed secret congressional sessions - primarily on
the grounds that such practices prevented the people from appreciating his wise
counsel and brilliant speeches. He hated being out of the political spotlight,
which may explain why he finally sought reelection to the Confederate Congress
in 1863 even though he stood little chance of winning. If returned to Richmond,
he planned to push for Davis's impeachment but the voters decided that it was
Rhett who was unfit for office.
In Rhett's memoir, the president received full blame for the Gettysburg
campaign plan, the loss of Vicksburg, and nearly every other military disaster.
After the War, the old fire-eater was in contact with both Joseph E. Johnston and
P.G.T. Beauregard, and their strong prejudices merely fed his venom against the
administration. Had Rhett been designing a headstone for the Confederacy, it
would have read: "Died of Davis."
The collapse of the southern nation, according to Rhett, marked the eclipse
of free government. The tyrannical Abraham Lincoln deserved assassination, and
even the conservative Andrew Johnson did not win the Carolinian's favor. In the
final pages, Rhett offered a long diatribe against the postwar constitutional
amendments as the epitome of despotism. To the embittered fire-eater, the
Reconstruction years culminated in an unholy alliance of northern "oligarches"
and southern "money-makers."
Yet he also predicted - abruptly shifting tone and torturing logic - that in
another 30 years, southern whites would once again be "masters" of their own
destinies, and one wonders if he even expected slavery to be magically reborn.
However that may be and however unattractive Rhett's views and prejudices, we
are in William C. Davis's debt for bringing this most unusual document into print
and helping us reenter the strange world of Robert Barnwell Rhett.
George C. Rable is the Charles Summersell Professor of Southern History at
the University of Alabama and is currently completing a work entitled,
Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!
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